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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-3256

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TERRANCE D. STRADFORD,
also known as Wayne Sellers,
also known as Doug Stradford
Terrance D. Stradford,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr.00275-001)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 14, 2010

Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: September 20, 2010)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Terrance Stradford argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND 1
Stradford, a dentist and businessman, along with two co-defendants, defrauded
multiple lending agencies in a scheme in which he offered the same parcel of real
property as collateral for various loans without informing each subsequent lender of the
true nature of the existing liens on that parcel. He also engaged in other financial fraud.
A complaint was filed against Stradford on December 28, 2005. He was arrested
in North Carolina on January 11, 2006, and was brought before a magistrate judge in the
District of New Jersey for his initial appearance on February 8, 2006. On February 9,
2006, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joshua Drew sent a letter to Stradford’s then-attorney,
Thomas R. Ashley, explaining that the government planned to present its case to a grand
jury the following week “unless . . . your client consents to excluding time for purposes of
calculations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, to allow for, among other
things, plea discussions and cooperation discussions.” (App. at 3.)
On February 14, 2006, the Magistrate Judge granted a forty-five day continuance.
The order noted that the parties sought the continuance to conduct plea discussions, but it
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Because of the limited nature of the appeal and the parties’ familiarity with the facts,
we present in summary fashion the conduct that set in motion the criminal proceeding
itself.
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mistakenly referred to the defendant not as Terrance D. Stradford – as the case caption
indicated was the defendant’s name – but rather, as “Christopher Snow.” (Id. at 4a.) The
Magistrate Judge ordered that “the period from and including February 17, 2006 through
and including April 3, 2006 shall be excludable in computing time under the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974.” (Id. at 4b.)
On April 5, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a twenty-three count indictment
against Stradford charging wire fraud and money laundering. On June 5, 2006, the
District Judge to whom the case was assigned granted Stradford’s request for a
continuance – made through his counsel – to allow “counsel . . . reasonable additional
time to review discovery, discuss plea negotiations, and file motions.” (Id. at 5a.) The
District Judge ordered that the case be continued from June 2 through August 1,
explaining that the time from June 5, 2006 “through August 1, 2006, shall be excluded in
computing time under the Speedy Trial Act.” (Id. at 5b.) She later granted three other
continuance motions, none of which is at issue in this appeal.
After the grand jury returned a twenty-four count superceding indictment, trial was
set to begin on September 10, 2007. Before it began, however, Stradford filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment due to violations of the Speedy Trial Act, which the District
Judge denied after an evidentiary hearing. Stradford was ultimately found guilty on all
twenty-four counts on September 26, and his post-trial motions were denied. On July 21,
2008, he was sentenced to 120 months’ incarceration on each of counts two through

-3-

twenty-three and 60 months’ incarceration on each of counts one and twenty-four, all to
be served concurrently. (Id. at 14b.) Stradford timely appealed.
DISCUSSION 2
Our review of a district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the indictment
as violative of the Speedy Trial Act implicates three standards of review. First, we
review de novo the court’s interpretation of the Act; second, we review the court’s factual
findings for clear error; and lastly, we review the decision granting a continuance for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 870 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 1988).
The Pre-Indictment February 14, 2006 Continuance Order
Under the Speedy Trial Act, “[a]ny information or indictment charging an
individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the
date on which such individual was arrested . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). In the event that
the defendant must be transferred from another district, the period for filing an indictment
may be extended by up to ten days. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F). Stradford was arrested in North
Carolina on January 11, 2006, and he was indicted on April 5, 2006 – eighty-four days
later. In its February 14 continuance order, the Magistrate Judge found that February 17
through April 3 “shall be excludable in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act.”
(App. at 4b.)
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The District Court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291.
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The Speedy Trial Act provides that certain “periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in
computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence.” 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h). Included among these enumerated exceptions is “[a]ny period of delay
resulting from a continuance . . . if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).3 In undertaking this
balancing, the court must set forth “in the record of the case, either orally or in writing,”
the reasons in support of its conclusion. Id. Such continuances may be granted “at the
request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
Government,” or even by the “judge on his own motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Stradford argues that the February 14 pre-indictment continuance order is invalid
because it contains inaccurate statements resulting from a lack of independent inquiry by
the Magistrate Judge. The order states that the motion for a continuance “c[a]me before
the Court on the joint application of . . . [the] United States Attorney for the District of
New Jersey (Joshua Drew, Assistant U.S. Attorney, appearing), and defendant
Christopher Snow (Thomas P. Ashley, Esq., appearing) . . . to allow the parties to conduct
plea negotiations and attempt to finalize a plea agreement.” (App. at 4a.) It also states:
IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that this action should be
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Prior to amendment in 2008, the “ends of justice” continuance was formerly codified
at subsection 8.
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continued for the following reasons:
(1) Plea negotiations are currently in progress, and both the United States
and the defendant desire additional time to negotiate a plea agreement.
...
(2) [T]he ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
(Id. at 4a-4b.) The reference to “Christopher Snow” is, obviously, a careless error.
Moreover, the negotiations were not – as the order indicates – “currently in progress” at
the time the order was executed. (Id. at 4b, 13:93.) Following the July 9, 2007
evidentiary hearing on Stradford’s motion to dismiss, the District Judge found that
Stradford’s attorney, Thomas P. Ashley, requested a continuance on his client’s behalf,
the factual errors contained in the order did not undermine its validity, and the substance
of the order comported with the dictates of the Speedy Trial Act.
First, as Stradford concedes, Ashley did not need his permission to request a
continuance order, particularly one, such as this, that is not open-ended. See New York v.
Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (“[S]cheduling matters are plainly among those for which
agreement by counsel generally controls.”). The order may be granted “at the request of
the defendant or his counsel.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added). Ashley
testified that he was not unfamiliar with his client at the time the continuance was sought:
for the previous nine months, he had been representing Stradford in a related civil matter.
After Ashley learned of the criminal investigation into Stradford’s business dealings, he
discussed it with Stradford, who maintained his innocence. On February 9, 2006, the
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prosecutor notified Ashley that he intended to present the case against Stradford to a
grand jury the following week “unless you inform me that your client consents to
excluding time for purposes of calculations under the Speedy Trial Act . . . , to allow for,
among other things, plea discussions and cooperation discussions.” (App. at 3.) Faced
with this letter, Ashley determined that it was in his client’s best interest to agree to a
continuance because “we were in the process of negotiating a bail package, No. 1; and,
No. 2 . . . I had wanted to get a chance not only to talk with Dr. Stradford but to talk to the
government with respect to what the nature of their case was.” (Id. at 13:72.) And, as the
District Judge noted, Ashley testified that plea negotiations were “in the back of his
mind.” (Id. at 13:115). Accordingly, Ashley agreed to the continuance without first
consulting Stradford, a decision that even Stradford’s new attorney later endorsed. (Id. at
13:109 (“[Ashley] was doing what was in the best interest of his client.”).)
Second, the two factual inaccuracies do not invalidate the continuance order.4 At
the time the order was issued, plea negotiations were not, as the order indicates,
“currently in progress.” (Id. at 4a.) It is clear from Ashley’s testimony, however, that he
wanted to better understand the government’s case so that, armed with that information,
he and Stradford could discuss how best to proceed before an indictment was returned.
(Id. at 13:101-02.) Stradford may have been opposed to a plea deal, but Ashley – whom
Stradford described as “an excellent attorney” (Id. at 13:55) – knew that this could
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The careless reference to “Christopher Snow” in the order does not impact the
validity of the order, and needs no further discussion.
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change once Stradford had a better understanding of the prosecution’s case. (Id. at 13:7273.) Ashley also knew that, as trial preparations progressed, plea discussions might be
explored, and, as it turns out, they were. (Id. at 13:94.)
Finally, the order complies with the procedural requirement that the court “set[]
forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons” for granting the
“ends of justice” continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Faced with a request for a
continuance from both parties, the Magistrate Judge did just that.
The June 5, 2006 Continuance Order
Stradford briefly attacks the validity of the June 5, 2006 pre-indictment
continuance order. The District Judge granted a continuance for the following reasons:
1.

The defendant, through his counsel, has requested additional time so
that counsel will have reasonable additional time to review discovery,
discuss plea negotiations, and file motions.

2.

The grant of a continuance will ensure the defendant continuity of
counsel in his representation.

3.

The grant of a continuance will likely conserve judicial resources.

4.

[T]he ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the
best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

(App. at 5a-b.) The District Judge then ordered that the time from June 5 through August
1, 2006 be excluded when computing the time for Speedy Trial Act purposes, and set
forth her reasons for granting the “ends of justice” continuance, reasons it confirmed in its
extensive oral opinion denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. Indeed, Ashley
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testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that he would not have been able to
review the discovery materials, discuss potential plea negotiations, file the motions that
he may have deemed necessary, and effectively represent Stradford without the
continuance order. (See App. at 13:79-80, 99.) The District Judge found that the ends of
justice would be served by granting the continuance, and did not abuse her discretion in
so doing.
CONCLUSION
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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